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Risk Tolerance, Self-Interest, and Social Preferences  
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
We use an experimental method to investigate whether systematic relationships exist across 
distinct aspects of individual preferences: risk aversion in monetary outcomes, altruism in a two-
person context, and social preferences in a larger group context. Individual preferences across 
these three contexts are measured, and there is no possibility for risk sharing, wealth effects, or 
updating expectations of the population choices. We find that social preferences are related to 
demographic variables, including years of education, gender, and age. Perhaps most importantly, 
self allocation in a two-person dictator game is related to social preferences in a group context. 
Participants who are more generous in a dictator game are more likely to vote against their self-
interest in a group decision-making task which we interpret to be expressions of social 
preferences. 
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Risk Tolerance, Self-Interest, and Social Preferences  
 
Preferences are central to economic decision-making. Economists generally assume that 
people’s preferences can be adequately represented using models of homo economicus or 
economic man, a purely self-interested economic actor. However there is a growing body of 
evidence in economics, psychology, and sociology supporting the view that people are social 
beings (homo socialis) who are concerned with the well being of others as well as their own well 
being. In the economics literature such preferences are often referred to as social preferences.1 
There are a number of theoretical models proposed in the literature that attempt to explain these 
findings. For example, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) assume social 
preferences are unconditional. In contrast, Rabin (1993), Cox, Freidman, and Gjerstad (2007), 
and Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj (2008) model social preferences as conditional on the context of 
the specific game and the behavior of other players. Despite the progress in understanding and 
modeling social preferences, there is still much to be learned about them.  
 This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to shed further light on the 
nature of social preferences and provide useful insights to theorists attempting to model them. In 
our experiment, we first measure altruism, using a two-player dictator game, and then we 
measure social preferences in a group context. We use altruism and social preferences as 
convenient terminology to distinguish between behavior in a two person dictator game and 
behavior in a group context, respectively. This distinction in terminology is important because 
behavior in the group context need not be strictly altruistic; individuals may have malevolent 
motivates, such as spite or envy. Therefore, the behavior in the group context may not be 
altruistic, but nonetheless such behavior may be expressions of social preferences. In this paper 
we examine whether a person’s expression of altruistic behavior in a dictator game is related to 
that same person’s expression of social preferences in a group context. More specifically, we 
explore whether a person that is more (less) generous in a dictator game is more likely to act 
against (in favor of) their self-interest in a group task. Our approach also allows us to control for 
potential confounding effects, such as gender, age, income, and education. 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Heinrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr, and Gintis (2004). 
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Since cooperation and benevolence may be adaptive responses for mitigating risk, it is 
interesting to examine whether there is any relationship between risk preferences and expressions 
of social preferences in a group task.2 Previous research also suggests that risk preferences may 
affect individual choices, therefore our experiment also includes a task in which we measure the 
risk preferences of participants.3 Finally, as discussed in greater detail below, Charness and 
Genicot (2004) and Charness and Gneezy (2007) report evidence that males take greater risks in 
investment games than females, and there is some evidence that women may be more generous 
or altruistic than men in dictator games. Therefore, it is important to control for gender in our 
regressions to eliminate this potential confounding variable. 
Prior research suggests that there is significant variability among individuals in the three 
preference task measures we elicit. For example, Charness and Genicot (2004) report significant 
diversity in risk preferences among individuals. In contrast, Baker, Laury, and Williams (2007) 
and Harrison, Lau, Rutström, and Tarazona-Gómez (2005) report that risk preferences appear to 
be consistent with individually held risk preferences when individuals are placed in groups. 
Bolton, Katok, and Zwick (1998) report that some people are quite generous when matched with 
an anonymous partner in dictator experiments; whereas other people are purely self-interested. In 
addition, Ackert, Martinez-Vazquez, and Rider (2007) and Ackert, Gillette, Martinez-Vazquez, 
and Rider (2007) find that while many people are unwilling to sacrifice their own income to 
benefit another in experiments that measure social preferences, some are willing to forfeit 
income to benefit others. In this paper we combine the three tasks described above to investigate 
whether risk preferences as expressed in an investment game, altruism in a dictator game, and 
social preferences in a group voting task with status are independent of each other and 
                                                 
2 For example, Collier and Gunning (1999) in their fascinating article on Africa’s growth 
performance explains that traditional African societies evolved the institutions of village and 
kinship group to reduce consumption risk due to weather related shocks to agriculture while 
reducing the potential costs of moral hazard and adverse selection. As they explain, membership 
in the kinship group is based on birth, which is nonelective, thus solving the problem of adverse 
selection. Living in close proximity to one another reduces monitoring costs thus solving the 
problem of moral hazard. Another example of cooperation among members of a species to 
reduce environmental risks is herding behavior among cattle or schooling among some species of 
fish. This behavior is believed to be an adaptive response to a hostile environment that requires 
cooperation among members of a species to mitigate the risks of predation. 
3 See, for example, Charness and Genicot (2004), Charness and Gneezy (2007), and Charness 
and Villeval (2007). 
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independent of observable attributes of the decision-maker, such as gender, age, and so on. 
Importantly we use a within-subject design to account for heterogeneity of individual preferences 
while controlling for possible confounding effects of risk sharing, changes in population 
expectations, and wealth effects. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section I we describe the 
experiment, including the details of each of the three tasks. In section II we present the findings 
for each of the individual tasks. In section III we consider whether a person’s risk preferences 
and expression of altruism in a two-person dictator game can predict her expressions of social 
preferences in a group context. We conclude in section IV with a summary of our results and 
suggestions for future research. 
 
I. Experimental Design and Method 
Each experimental session includes three tasks to measure distinct aspects of individual 
preferences: risk preferences, altruism, and social preferences in a voting game. We conducted a 
total of six sessions, and every subject completed all three sections of the experiment. There are 
two subject pools. Four sessions included students at a large urban university (students), and two 
sessions included foreign nationals who work in the area of public policy (policy group) in 
developing countries. Salient monetary earnings were paid with average earnings of about $50 
per participant. The instructions are included in appendix A, and table 1 summarizes the 
experimental sessions. 
At the beginning of each session, participants were randomly seated and widely dispersed 
in a large classroom to maintain privacy in decision making. Introductory written instructions 
were distributed, and the experimenter (the same person in all six sessions) read the instructions 
aloud as participants followed along. Instructions for each of the three tasks were distributed 
after each preceding section was completed. Participants were told that there would be three 
sections to the experiment and that their choices in one section would not affect their choices or 
earnings in any other section. To reduce the potential for wealth effects across sections, 
outcomes and earnings for each section were determined at the end of each session. 
The first section of the experiment provides a measure of risk aversion regarding 
monetary outcomes. Participants were asked to allocate ten dollars between a safe and risky asset. 
The second section measures a participant’s social preferences in a two-person context, using 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4
 
 
their responses as an allocator of ten dollars in an anonymous dictator game. The third section 
measures a participant’s social preferences in a group context by asking them to choose between 
two tax distributions. Each of the thirteen pairs of tax distribution choices involved an 
anonymous group of five members where each group member has a unique and pre-determined 
pre-tax income level. A subject’s endowed pre-tax income level in this task reflects his status, or 
relative position, in the group. 
At the end of each session earnings for each section of the experiment were determined 
and total earnings calculated. In addition to their earnings from the three tasks, subjects earned 
$4 if they arrived on time to the experiment and $4 for completing a post-experiment 
questionnaire which was designed to gather demographic information as well as their views on 
the experiment. The specific design considerations for each section of the experiment are 
described below in greater detail. 
Section 1: Risk Preferences 
After a general introductory section was read to the participants, instructions for the 
investment task were distributed. The purpose of this first task is to elicit individual risk 
preferences. Participants were asked to make a single choice regarding the investment of cash. 
They were given an endowment of $10 of which they could invest any portion in a risky asset 
that had a 50 percent chance of success. To determine earnings from the investment, a randomly 
chosen participant flipped a coin at the end of the experimental session to determine the success 
of the investment.4 If the investment was successful, the amount invested increased in value by 
2.5 (or 250 percent), and if it was unsuccessful each participant would lose the amount that they 
invested in the risky asset. Thus, a participant’s section 1 earnings was the sum of the portion of 
the $10 that they did not invest plus the amount that they did invest times zero or 2.5, depending 
on the outcome of the coin flip. After participants completed both decision sheets, the 
“Investment Choice Sheets” were collected by a monitor so that participants could not change 
their investment decision, and the participants put “Their Copy” into their folder of experimental 
materials. 
Section 2: Altruism 
                                                 
4 The results of the coin tosses are reported in table 1. 
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As in section 1, participants were asked to make a single choice concerning the allocation 
of $10 in cash, but this time the allocation was between themselves and another anonymous, 
randomly selected participant in the session. They were told that at the end of the experimental 
session 50 percent of the participants would be randomly chosen to be allocators. Allocators 
would earn the amount they allocated to themselves, while the remaining participants would be 
recipients whose earnings would be determined by the “recipient amount” allocated by one of the 
chosen allocators. Participants were told that in making their allocation choice they should 
assume that they would be among the chosen allocators. The purpose of this second task was to 
elicit altruistic or benevolent behavior in a two-person context. 
The instructions make it clear that neither they, nor their matched partner, would be able 
to discover one another’s identities at any time. To maintain the anonymity of the matched 
partner, participants were given a code ID at the top of the first two pages of their section 2 
instructions. This code ID was completely different from their participant number, which was 
used for decisions in the experimental session. Neither the code ID nor the participant number 
appeared on the third sheet or “Recipient Copy” of section 2. This ensured the allocator’s 
anonymity to the matched recipient partner. Participants were instructed that their allocation 
decision must be the same on all three sheets. After making their allocation choices, participants 
were asked to put their sheet labeled, “Instructions for Section 2,” in their folders and then fold 
the other two sheets together, labeled “Allocator (or Recipient) Copy,” so that a monitor could 
collect them. By having these two sheets folded together, the monitor could later identify and 
select the chosen allocator’s “Recipient Copy” to hand out to the randomly chosen recipient.  
The anonymous randomization of the participants as allocators or recipients was executed 
in the following way. When the section 2 instructions were handed out, each participant was 
given a poker chip that had the same code ID number on it as on their instruction sheet.  
Participants were asked to verify that the code ID was the same and to place the chip into the 
monitor’s empty bucket. In a session of twenty (ten) participants, ten (five) chips were randomly 
drawn from the bucket at the end of the session. The selected chips identified the participants, by 
code ID, who became the designated “allocators.” 
Section 3: Social Preferences  
After making their two-person allocation choice, the instructions for section 3 were read 
aloud. After the section 3 instructions were completed and all participant questions were 
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answered, the thirteen tax decision choice sheets were distributed. Each decision is a paired 
choice between “Tax 1” and “Tax 2” which determined the tax, and consequently after-tax 
income and section earnings, for each member of a five person group. The vote of the majority 
of each group determined the tax for that group. The purpose of this third task was to elicit 
individual social preferences in a group context. 
There were twenty (ten) participants in each session and thus four (two) different groups 
per decision. The members of the groups for each of the thirteen decisions were anonymous and 
pre-randomized, and each member within a group had a different pre-tax income level. In all 
thirteen decision pairs, Tax 1 is always a flat $5 tax for each member of the group. The paired 
Tax 2 distributions were chosen, given the limits of our time and attention, to minimize 
collinearity so that we could evaluate as many theories of social preferences as possible. 
Participants knew that only one of the thirteen decisions would be randomly chosen for the 
determination earnings for this section.5 
The pre-tax income or status of each participant was determined by drawing a card from 
a set of twenty (ten) cards, one for each participant. In the set of cards there were four (two) 
cards for each of the five pre-tax income levels: $10, $20, $30, $40, and $50. Participants were 
told to keep their income card private information and that they would have the same pre-tax 
income for all thirteen decisions. As the cards were drawn, a monitor recorded the pre-tax 
income level by participant number which facilitated the pre-randomization of groups. 
Participants were informed that the groups were randomized so that there was always one 
member with each of the five pre-tax income levels. To set a common knowledge benchmark, 
they were also told that the total income in each group was $150, and the average income was 
$30. Both the after-tax income distribution and taxes paid by each group member were presented 
in table form next to the pre-tax income levels for each tax distribution choice. Although one 
piece of information can be easily calculated from the other, we presented both pieces of 
information to eliminate possible framing biases across individuals. Participants had 30 minutes 
to complete the thirteen decisions, and this was never a binding constraint. After all decision 
                                                 
5 Recently, Hey and Lee (2007) examine whether when paying subjects for just one choice they 
respond to the complete set of questions or separate various questions. They conclude that 
subjects separate the various questions. 
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sheets had been collected a monitor tallied the votes by decision for each group which was 
shown on a screen using an overhead projector during the earnings determination section.    
The design considerations of group anonymity and the reporting of majority votes after 
all decisions reduces the possibility of visually-related personal biases, controls for wealth 
effects between decisions, and promotes stationarity of population expectations across the 
thirteen decisions. Importantly, there is no economic incentive for risk sharing in this task 
because (1) income level and income rank for each participant were held constant, (2) group 
membership was anonymous, and (3) groups were re-randomized after each of the thirteen tax 
distribution decisions.   
 
II. Experimental Results 
A total of 110 subjects completed the experiment, including 70 university students and 40 
foreign nationals in the policy group. Three participants did not provide their age, so we 
eliminated them from the sample used for analysis. Descriptive statistics for the sample of 107 
participants and for each subject pool are reported in table 2. The average age across both subject 
pools is 31.6, with the average age of the policy group somewhat greater (41.4) than the 
university students (26.2). Thirty-six percent of our sample reported household income greater 
than $25,000 per year, and the corresponding figure for the policy professionals is only 18 
percent. These features of our sample reflect the fact that a large fraction of the student 
population consists of part-time students many of whom work full-time, and the policy 
professionals come from very low income countries, primarily in Sub-Saharan Africa. Across all 
participants, 65 percent are male, 65 percent self-supporting, and 21 percent report household 
incomes in excess of $50,000 per year.   
Section 1: Risk Preferences 
As previously discussed, each participant was asked to allocate $10 between a risk free 
asset and a risky one. Figure 1 illustrates the frequency of allocations to the risky asset for the 
complete sample of 110 participants. On average, participants allocated $6.12 to the risky asset. 
Every participant allocated something to the risky asset and most risked at least half of their 
endowment. Over forty percent of the participants invested between $4 and $6, with the modal 
frequency at half the endowment ($5). Only 2.7 percent of participants invested $2 or less in the 
risky asset, while approximately 15 percent invested at least $8. This distribution of risk 
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preferences across investment categories is similar to that reported by Charness and Genicot 
(2004). In the empirical analysis presented below we denote the amount invested in the risky 
asset as “risky,” which is our measure of individual risk preferences. As previously noted, a 
higher value of “risky” indicates a greater tolerance for risk taking. 
To examine whether individual attributes are related to risk preferences in this task, we 
estimate OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the amount allocated to the risky asset. 
The independent variables include the number of years in university (years in university); a 
dummy variable set equal to 1.0 if female (gender); a dummy variable set equal to 1.0 if the 
participant is a member of the policy group (policy students); number of completed university 
courses in finance and economics (economics courses); a dummy variable set equal to 1.0 for 
business majors (business students); a vector of dummy variables indicating whether the 
participant’s primary source of income is self-support (self support), support by a parent 
(parental support), or support by a spouse (spousal support); total household income; and age and 
age-squared.6 All of this information was self-reported by the participants on the post-experiment 
questionnaire. 
The regression results are reported in table 3. We report the results of a variety of 
specifications in order to shed light on the stability of the estimated coefficients to the inclusion 
of the demographic variables. However, our discussion of the results focuses on the estimates 
reported in the last column of table 3. They indicate that males and subjects in the policy group 
are less risk averse. In addition, those whose primary source of income is through self-support or 
parental support are less risk averse. According to our estimates, risk is nonlinear in age. Risk 
aversion is increasing at a decreasing rate in age and reaches a maximum at the age of 82 which 
is outside the range of our data. 
The significance of gender in risk-taking behavior is consistent with the evidence 
reported in the existing literature. Charness and Genicot (2004) and Charness and Gneezy (2007) 
                                                 
6 Total household income is a variable that assumes integer values between 1 and 5, where 1.0 
indicates total household income is less than $25,000; 2.0 indicates household income is between 
$25,000 and $50,000; 3.0 indicates total household income is between $50,000 and $75,000; 4.0 
indicates total household income is between $75,000 and $100,000; and 5.0 indicates total 
household income is greater than $100,000. 
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also report that males invest more in the risky asset.7 Increased risk-taking by men may be 
related to their tendency toward overconfidence which can lead to sub-optimal decision-making. 
For example, based on 35,000 household brokerage accounts Barber and Odean (2001) present 
evidence that men trade more often than women, and men also generate lower returns to trades. 
In contrast to our findings, Charness and Villeval (2007) find that their older participants 
are not more risk-averse in their experiments. Similarly, Ackert, Church, and Englis (2002) 
report evidence that age does not affect people’s portfolio allocations to equity. Importantly they 
find that psychological orientation, regardless of age, affects the way investors make risky 
choices. In the tax compliance literature, however, age is often included as an explanatory 
variable in tax compliance regressions. Typically such studies report that tax compliance 
increases with the age of the taxpayer; in other words, older taxpayers, ceteris paribus, are more 
compliant in paying their tax liabilities than younger taxpayers.8 This finding is typically 
interpreted to mean that older people have a lower tolerance for risk.  
Section 2: Altruism 
As previously discussed, participants also were asked to make a single choice concerning 
the allocation of $10 in cash between themselves and another anonymous, randomly selected 
participant in the session. Randomly chosen allocators received the amount they allocated to 
themselves, while the remaining participants received the amount allocated to the recipient by 
their randomly paired allocator. As figure 2 shows for the complete sample of 110 participants, 
the vast majority kept at least half of their endowment of $10. On average, participants’ self-
allocation is $6.90, denoted in subsequent analysis as “self”. In fact, 18 percent of the 
participants kept all of it. By comparison, 36 percent of the participants in Forsythe, Horowitz, 
Savin, and Selton (1994) offered zero to their paired recipient in a dictator game.9        
                                                 
7 In their survey of the literature, Croson and Gneezy (2004) report that the majority of 
laboratory and field studies conclude that women are more risk-averse. 
8 See, for example, Clotfelter (1983), Joulfaian and Rider (1996 and 1998), and Martinez-
Vazquez and Rider (2005). 
9 Many dictator games are reported in the literature and there is significant variability in self-
allocations. In their examination of this variability, Bolton, Katok, and Zwick (1998) conclude 
that differences in context and written instructions are the sources of the observed 
inconsistencies. Our instructions, included in the appendix, are standard and because earnings 
from all sections are determined at the end of the experiment, the total earnings available across 
the experiment should not impact allocations in the dictator game. 
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To examine whether individual attributes are related to self-allocations, we estimate 
regressions with the dependent variable defined as the allocation to self. The independent 
variables are the same as those used in the regressions for the allocation to the risky asset. The 
results reported in table 4 indicate that self-allocation is positively correlated with the number of 
economics and finance courses, and negatively correlated with self- and spousal-support. We 
report the results of a variety of specifications in order to shed light on the stability of the 
estimated coefficients to the inclusion of the demographic variables. However, our discussion of 
the results focuses on the estimates reported in the last column of table 4. The statistical 
significance of the variable “number of economics and finance courses” in our anonymous 
dictator context is consistent with the finding by Frank, Gilovich and Regan (1993) that there is a 
training effect in economics in certain cooperative contexts; although the extent differs across 
games, communication protocols, and anonymity conditions. Turning back to the discussion of 
the results reported in table 4, participants who support themselves or are supported by a spouse 
actually are more generous, keeping less of their allocation for themselves, than those who are 
supported by their parents or receive other means of support, such as scholarships. It is 
noteworthy that gender, subject pool, age, and age-squared are not statistically significant at 
conventional levels.10 
Previous research reports inconsistent findings regarding the relationship between gender 
and altruism. Social science research concludes that females are more pro-socially oriented than 
males, and in their baseline dictator experiments Eckel and Grossman (1998) find that women 
are twice as generous as men. However, Cox and Deck (2006) conclude that the question of 
which gender is more generous does not have a simple answer. They contend that the context of 
the decision is critical. For example, women are more likely to be generous when the stakes are 
                                                 
10 We also estimated specifications that included the variable “risky”, but the estimated 
coefficient is statistically insignificant at conventional levels, so these results are not reported 
here. Since there is no opportunity for reciprocity in a dictator game, it perhaps comes as no 
surprise that attitudes toward risk do not appear to play a role in the amount allocated to self. 
However, we thought that if cooperative behavior is an evolutionary response to mitigate 
environmental risks such as predation, then perhaps we would find a relationship between a 
person’s attitudes toward risk and altruism in a dictator game. In other words, if these 
preferences are somehow hard-wired in our species, and one in response to another, then perhaps 
the two preferences covary in an individual, and this correlation would potentially manifest itself 
in the two games. In any event, our results do not support this hypothesis.  
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smaller. Croson and Gneezy (2004) conclude that women are typically more generous than men 
when efficiency is not a concern. If efficiency gains are possible, women choose equal payments 
whereas men tend to choose the more equal allocation. As for the insignificant effect of age on 
social preferences, no previous study of which we are aware reports a significant effect of age, 
with the exceptions of Murnighan and Saxon (1998) and Fehr, Bernhard, and Rockenbach (2008) 
who report that very young children are more generous. 
Section 3: Social Preferences 
 Our third task provides a measure of participants’ social preferences in a group context 
allowing for potential status effects, as induced by the endowed pre-tax income levels. In our 
participant pool we find that slightly more than 80 percent of observed votes are consistent with 
self-interest, i.e., voting for the distribution that maximizes own payoff.  Interestingly, only 48 
percent of the participants consistently vote for the distribution that maximizes own payoff 
across all 13 tables. Of the 1,391 votes cast in the third task of our experiment, 246 votes are 
consistent with a willingness to sacrifice. In our analysis, we classify a decision as consistent 
with self-interest (social = 0) if the vote is cast for the distribution that maximizes own payoff; 
whereas a vote is consistent with social preferences (social = 1) if the subject votes for the 
alternative with a smaller own payoff. Seventeen percent of the votes reflect motives that are not 
consistent with maximizing own payoff, and 52 percent of the individuals vote at least once 
against maximizing their own payoff. As reported in Ackert, Gillette, Martinez-Vazquez, and 
Rider (2007), this result is consistent with Charness and Rabin (2002) among others who report 
evidence of social preferences in individual and group decision making contexts.11  
Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of the 246 other-regarding votes, according to the cost 
or sacrifice from voting against the alternative that would maximize own payoff. The horizontal 
axis indicates the sacrifice in terms of loss in own payoff from voting against one’s own-interest. 
The vertical axis is the percent of other regarding votes in which the numerator is the frequency 
                                                 
11 Ackert, Gillette, Martinez-Vazquez, and Rider (2007) use the data from the third task of the 
experiment reported in this paper to examine the mini-max preferences of Rawls (1971) and the 
inequality aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). They conclude that both models help 
explain the choices of participants. In contrast, in a highly influential study, Engelmann and 
Strobel (2004 and 2006) find inequality aversion has no additional explanatory power relative to 
a model that simply accounts for mini-max preferences and concerns about efficiency or the sum 
of all payoffs.  
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of social votes for a given sacrifice in own-payoff, and the denominator is the number of the 
1,391 total votes that could potential result in a given sacrifice. In this manner, figure 3 controls 
for the number of opportunities out of 1,391 opportunities to cast a social vote for each given 
sacrifice. It is interesting to note that the percent of social votes is decreasing in the size of the 
sacrifice in own-payoff, suggesting an inverse relationship between social preferences and the 
price of expressing such preferences. Turning to figure 4, it shows the distribution of social votes 
by status level for the complete sample of 110 participants. As the figure indicates, we actually 
observe more social votes for high status participants (income = $40 and $50) than for those 
whose status is below the median (income = $10 and $20). Interestingly the results from the third 
task do not appear to support a strong role for status in determining social behavior. More 
specifically there are 77 social votes among the low status participants as opposed to 98 social 
votes among the high status participants. At first glance status in this task does not appear to 
determine generosity. However, as we show below, status has a positive and statistically 
significant effect at conventional levels on the probability of casting a social vote. 
 
III. Do Risk Preference and Selfishness Predict Social Preference? 
To examine whether an individual’s risk preferences in monetary outcomes, altruism in a 
two-person context, and social preferences in a group context are systematically related, we next 
combine the evidence collected across the three tasks described above. Can we predict whether 
an individual expresses social preferences based on decisions observed regarding risk 
preferences and altruism defined in a two-person context?   
The challenge in selecting an econometric model for gauging the determinants of social 
preferences or tastes for distributional equity is twofold. First, there is not a widely accepted 
economic theory of the way in which social preferences enter the individual utility functions.  
There are a number of competing theories, and the research on the relative performance of these 
theories is in its infancy. Second, the source of social preferences is not clear. According to one 
school of thought, other-regarding behavior is an intrinsic attribute of the individual that may be 
independent of the observable characteristics of the individual, such as age, gender, education, 
income, and so on.  In contrast, others contend that fairness and altruism result from biology, 
socialization, and other life experiences. For still other researchers, social preferences depend on 
the behavior of others and an individual’s status, so that other-regarding tendencies vary for a 
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particular person across situations. To further complicate matters, there is some preliminary 
evidence that a large fraction of the population may be conditional cooperators, while others may 
be unconditionally cooperative (Mother Theresa being perhaps an example), and still others may 
be unconditionally competitive as assumed in the conventional model of economic man. 
One must first choose among the competing theories of social preferences in order to 
choose an appropriate econometric model. Rather than taking a firm stand among these 
competing theories, we adopt the strategy of trying to model each theory and gauge the 
performance of the different models. More specifically, we estimate probit regressions with a 
binary dependent variable which indicates whether the participant votes for or against self-
interest in the social preferences task (social vote = 1). The independent variables include 
individual’s risk preferences, status, self-allocation in the dictator game, sacrifice in own-payoff 
from voting against one’s self interest, the changes in disadvantageous and advantageous 
inequality, and the demographic variables used in the previous analyses of the other two tasks.12  
In the inequality aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) people are concerned about 
their own payoff but are averse to disadvantageous and advantageous payoff inequality. 
Following their definitions, we measure the difference in disadvantageous and advantageous 
inequality in the social preferences task using Δ(n-1)-1Σjmax(πj – πi, 0) and Δ(n-1)-1Σjmax(πi – πj, 
0), respectively, where πi is the payoff of the ith participant.13 Again, we report the results of a 
variety of specifications in order to shed light on the stability of the estimated coefficients on the 
                                                 
12 Ackert, Gillette, Martinez-Vazquez, and Rider (2007) include a measure of change in the 
payoff to the worst off participant to control for mini-max preferences and the change in the sum 
of individual payoffs to control for concerns about efficiency. When these variables are included 
in the analysis of this paper these variables do not explain participant choices. We believe that 
this discrepancy in findings in two closely related studies stems primarily from the differences in 
the definition of the dependent variable. The dependent variable as we define it here provides a 
more restrictive test of social preferences because it attempts to explain votes for or against one’s 
own self-interest. Whereas, in Ackert et al. (2007) the dependent variable is simply coded 1 if the 
participant votes for tax 2 and 0 otherwise. The sensitivity of the results seemingly to minor 
changes in model specification highlights the complexity of using a generic term such as altruism 
to explain multifaceted social behavior within and across games. 
13 Note that in this study, we calculate the difference in disadvantageous inequality (ddi) and the 
difference in advantageous inequality (dai) differently than in Ackert et al (2007). In this study, 
ddi and dai are calculated relative to the tax (1 or 2) that reduces the individual’s own payoff; 
whereas, Ackert et al. calculate ddi and dai relative to tax 2.  The calculation of ddi and dai is 
different because of the change in the definition of the dependent variable described above. 
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variables of primary interest to the inclusion of the demographic variables. However, our 
discussion of the results focuses on the estimates reported in the last column of table 5. 
The results reported in table 5 indicate that those participants with changes in 
advantageous inequality, higher number of years in university, who are males, business students, 
and higher income, are less prone to cast social votes. In contrast, higher status participants and 
those whose primary source of financial support is self-support are more likely to cast social 
votes. Risk preferences do not appear to play a significant role. Perhaps of greatest interest in the 
present context is that the estimated coefficient of the variable “self allocation in dictator game” 
is negative and statistically significant at conventional levels. This finding is consistent across all 
five specifications, and so this result is unlikely due to omitted variables or confounding effects. 
The finding suggests that individuals that allocate more to the recipient in the dictator game are 
more likely to vote against their self interest in the group context. In other words, the behaviors 
in the two games appear to be related to one another.14  
We also believe that our results confront us with a paradox. The motive in the group 
context that would be most obviously consistent with altruistic preferences is aversion to 
disadvantageous inequality. Yet, the estimated coefficient on the variable used to control for this 
preference is statically insignificant at conventional levels. As previously noted, we also estimate 
specifications that control for mini-max preferences and concerns about efficiency which would 
also be consistent with altruistic preferences. However, the estimated coefficients of these 
control variables are also statistically insignificant at conventional levels. While we find a role 
for altruism in explaining the votes against one’s own self interest, the variables that we use to 
control for such preferences are statistically insignificant. In contrast, we find that aversion to 
                                                 
14 We also estimated specifications that include the variable “risky” which is the individual’s 
allocation to the risky asset and a proxy measure of that individual’s attitude toward risk. The 
estimated coefficient of this variable is statistically insignificant at conventional levels. As 
previously noted the design of this section carefully excludes any opportunities for risk sharing; 
therefore, it perhaps comes as no surprise that attitudes toward risk do not appear to have any 
predictive ability in the context of this game. As previously discussed, however, we thought that 
perhaps, if our species is hard-wired to cooperate as a means originally of mitigating 
environmental risks, such as predation, then risk aversion and altruism may be correlated with 
one another in our hard-wiring, and this feature of the make-up of our species would potentially 
manifest itself in our experiments. The results of the experiments reported here lead us to reject 
this hypothesis. 
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advantageous inequality helps explain votes against one’s own self interest. Yet, this motive 
would seem to reflect envy or spite, not altruism.  
On the one hand, the findings reported in this paper should be reassuring to theorists and 
behavioral economists alike because there is some consistency in motives across the two games 
examined in this study. Specifically, our results suggest that the willingness to sacrifice own 
payoff to benefit another in the two person dictator game is related to the willingness to sacrifice 
own payoff in the group context to benefit others. On the other hand, our results raise concerns 
because they suggest that we do not have a satisfactory theory of altruistically motivated 
behavior in a group context. 
Finally, the results of an alternative estimated model provide additional insight. Since the 
focus of this paper is to explain the behavior of those who sacrifice their own payoff to benefit 
others, we are particularly interested in the sub-set of individuals among the 107 participants in 
our experiment who voted at least once against maximizing their own payoff in the 13 tax 
decisions. However, we can not simply estimate models on this subset of participants because 
this would raise the issue of sample selection bias. To address this concern, we estimated a 
Heckman type sample selection model. Using our sample of 107 participants, we estimated a 
first stage regression in which the dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1.0 if the 
participant voted at least once against maximizing their own payoff in the 13 tax decisions, and 0 
otherwise. We use “self allocation in the dictator game” as an instrumental variable in this first 
stage regression which also includes the other regressors employed in table 5. Self allocation has 
the expected positive sign and is statistically significant at conventional levels. Then, we 
compute the inverse Mills ratio and include it in a second stage regression in which the 
dependent variable is defined as in table 5, or equal to 1.0 if the vote cast is for the tax that 
reduces one’s own payoff. This second stage regressions includes all the regressors used in table 
5, except self-allocation which is excluded in the second stage regression in order to identify the 
parameters of the model. In contrast to table 5, this second stage regression is estimated using 
only the votes cast on the 13 decisions by the subset of participants who cast a vote against their 
self interest at least once. Interestingly, we reject the hypothesis at conventional significance 
levels that the two equations are statistically independent, using a likelihood ratio test. The p-
value of this test statistic is 0.26, which indicates that this model has some merit. In any event, 
the results of the second stage regression are generally consistent with the estimates reported in 
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table 5; therefore, in the interests of space, we do not report these results. However, these results 
are suggestive and may be worth pursuing in future research. 
 
IV. Summary 
 We examine risk preferences, altruism, and social preferences in a laboratory experiment 
where we specifically control for risk sharing, changes in population expectations, and wealth 
effects. We report a systematic relationship between self allocation in a dictator game and social 
preferences in a group task, suggesting that social preferences, or the lack thereof, may be a 
fundamental trait of each individual’s psychological orientation that explains behavior in the two 
contexts. Importantly social behavior can be predicted by years of education, gender, university 
major, age, and primary household support. Participants who are less educated, female, non-
business majors, older, and not primarily supported by their spouse are more likely to vote 
against their self-interest. Risk preferences are related to gender, but do not appear to be 
systematically related to age or altruistic behavior. Among participants who vote socially, those 
with higher relative status in our experiment actually voted more often against their self-interest, 
compared to those with lower status. 
Future research should examine the impact of earned status on social behavior. Recall 
that status is endowed in our experiment. The existing literature does not provide a clear answer 
to the question of whether an earnings-based notion of justice has important effects on social 
preferences (see, for example, Rutström and Williams 2000 and Hoffman and Spitzer 1985). 
Another important issue for future investigation is how reciprocal behavior impacts a person who 
is a conditional cooperator. How do past actions and expectations of future actions of those with 
whom we interact affect our future behavior? Surely a person’s choices are not independent of 
others but how quickly does behavior adapt and when does the change become permanent, if 
ever? The goal should be a parsimonious model of behavior. In our ancestral past, mammals, 
primates, or people, depending on the stage of evolution, engaged in repeated interactions that 
many believe may have hard-wired us to react in certain ways. An important question regarding 
the source or relative weighting of social preferences remains: nature or nurture? 
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Appendix A 
Instructions 
 
The experimental instructions for each section of the experiment follow. 
 
General Instructions 
 
This experiment is concerned with the economics of decision-making.  There are three 
instructional decision-making sections.  After one section is completed, we will move to the 
following section.  Your total earnings will be the sum of your individual section earnings and 
will be paid to you in cash at the end of the session today.  Note that your choices in a given 
section will not affect your choices or earning potential in any other section.  
 
It is important that you do not talk or make noises during the experiment.  All of your 
decisions in the experiment are your own private information.  If you have any questions at any 
time, please raise your hand and a monitor will come to assist you. 
 
[New page] 
         Participant ID   
Instructions for Section 1 
“Your Copy” 
 
You are asked to make a single choice.  The choice concerns the investment of cash.  
You are endowed with $10 and can invest any portion of the $10 in a risky asset that has a 50% 
chance of success.  If the investment is successful, the amount invested increases in value by 2.5 
(or 250%).  The amount you do not invest does not change in value and is yours to keep.  Note 
that if you invest $Z in the asset there are two equally likely outcomes: 
 
1. $2.5*Z + $(10 – Z) or, in words, you invest $Z and the investment is successful. 
2. $(10 – Z) or, in words, you invest $Z and the investment is unsuccessful. 
 
At the conclusion of the experiment today, we will actually determine the outcome of your 
investment choice.  A participant in this room will toss a coin and if heads appears, the 
investment is successful and the amount you invested grows by 250%.  If tails appears, you lose 
the amount you invested and take home $(10 - Z).    
 
After all participants’ questions have been answered, please indicate your investment below.  
Then record this amount onto the “Section 1 Investment Choice Sheet” which a monitor will 
pick up from you and verify that you have recorded the same investment choice on both sheets.  
After the monitor has been by, please put this sheet into your folder until the end of the 
experiment when earnings will be determined.  You will have 5 minutes to record your 
investment.   
 
I invest $_______________________ in the risky asset.  Remember that you can invest any 
amount from $0 to $10. 
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Your Section 1 Earnings: 
 [ $________________ *  ________________ ] + [ _________________ ] = $ _______________   
Your investment in           2.5 or 0              The amount you   Your Section 1 Earnings 
    the risky asset           determined by coin toss    do not invest 
            (Z)                                               ($10-Z) 
 
Recall that after all sections of the experiment are completed a coin will be tossed to 
determine the success or not of your investment.  At that time you will calculate your earnings 
for this section.   
 
[New page] 
      Participant ID   
 
Section 1 Investment Choice Sheet 
 
I invest $_______________________ in the risky asset.  Remember that you can invest any 
amount from $0 to $10 and this must be the same amount that you recorded on the Instructions 
for Section 1 sheet labeled, “Your Copy”. 
 
[New page] 
         Code ID   
 
  Instructions for Section 2 
 
You are asked to make a single choice.  Recall that, your choice in a given section does 
not affect your choices or earning potential in any other section.  The choice concerns the 
allocation of $10 in cash to yourself (the allocator) and another anonymous, randomly selected 
participant (the recipient) in this room.  Neither of you will be told at any time or be able to find 
out the identity of your matched partner.   
 
 Notice that there are three sheets in this section of the instructions.  The first two sheets 
have a code ID instead of your participant number, and the third sheet, the “Recipient” Copy for 
Section 2, has neither a code ID nor a participant number.  This is to ensure the anonymity of 
your decision to the other participants in the room.  Your allocation decision must be the same 
on all three sheets.  After you have recorded your allocation choice on all three sheets, please 
put this sheet (labeled Instructions for Section 2) in your folder and then fold together the other 
two sheets, labeled respectively, Allocator (Recipient) Copy for Section 2, and place them face 
down on your desk.  A monitor will then come by and collect these two sheets.   
 
In responding you should assume that you will be among the allocators.  Suppose as an 
allocator you choose to allocate $X to yourself and $(10-X) to a recipient.  If you are among the 
50% of participants selected as an allocator, you will receive $X and a randomly chosen 
participant will receive $(10-X). 
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At the conclusion of the experimental session today, half of the participants in this room 
will be randomly selected to take the role of the allocator.  The other half of the participants will 
be recipients.  With these instructions you received a poker chip marked with your code ID 
number.  A monitor will now come by and collect them into an empty bucket.  At the end of 
session, ten chips will be randomly drawn from the bucket.  These selected chips will identify the 
participants, by code ID, who will be the designated “allocators” for this section of the 
experiment.  Those participants whose code ID chips were not selected will be the designated 
“recipients”.  For the chosen allocators, their respective “Recipient” Copy of Section 2 sheets 
will then be randomized and handed out to the designated recipients.  Thus, if your code ID chip 
is selected your earnings will be the allocation of the $10 that you gave yourself.  If your code ID 
chip is not selected, your earnings will be determined by the recipient allocation on the sheet 
randomly handed to you.      
 
 After all participants’ questions have been answered, please indicate your allocations 
below.  You will have 5 minutes to record your decision. 
 
I allocate $_________ to myself and the recipient gets $_________.  Remember that 
you can allocate any amount from $0 to $10 but the allocation to yourself and the recipient 
must sum to $10.  Please put this sheet in your folder when you are finished making your 
allocation decision. 
 
 
[New page] 
         Code ID   
 
  “Allocator” Copy for Section 2 
 
I allocate $_________ to myself and the recipient gets $_________.   
 
Remember that your allocation must be the same on all three sheets.  Recall  that 
you can allocate any amount from $0 to $10 but the allocation to yourself and  the recipient 
must sum to $10. 
 
 
[New page] 
 
Recipient” Copy for Section 2 
 
I allocate $_________ to myself and the recipient gets $_________.   
 
Remember that your allocation must be the same on all three sheets.  Recall  that 
you can allocate any amount from $0 to $10 but the allocation to yourself and  the recipient 
must sum to $10. 
 
[New page] 
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Instruction Section 3 
 
This section of the experiment consists of a series of thirteen decisions.  You will not find 
out how much you have earned until you have completed all thirteen decisions.  You will be 
given a maximum of 30 minutes to complete this section of the experiment. 
 
For each of the thirteen decisions, your earnings will be determined by your pre-tax 
income and the tax chosen by your group.  There will be five members in each group and the 
majority vote will determine the tax for all members of your group.  For each of the thirteen 
decisions you are re-randomized into a different group.  The members of your group will be 
anonymous to you.  None of you will know the identity of your group members.   
 
 Your pre-tax income in this section of the experiment will be determined by drawing a 
card from a set of five cards.  The pre-tax incomes recorded on the five cards are as follows: $10, 
$20, $30, $40, and $50.  Your income card is private information and you should not disclose 
it to other participants at any time.   
 
[Stop for the drawing of your pre-tax income card].   
 
Note that in each group there will be one member with each pre-tax income level.  Thus, 
before taxes are paid the total income in each group is $150 and the average income of the group 
is $30.  Each of you will keep this same pre-tax income for all thirteen decisions in this section 
of the experiment.    
 
 Whether you pay Tax 1 or Tax 2 on your pre-tax income depends on the majority vote of 
your group.  For each of the thirteen decisions you will be given a Tax Table that summarizes the 
tax that is paid by each member of your group and the resulting after-tax income.   
 
Your Section 3 Record Sheet shows thirteen decisions.  Each decision is a paired choice 
between “Tax 1” and “Tax 2”.  You will record your group number for each decision in the 
second column and your tax choice in the third column.  Only one of the thirteen choices will be 
used to determine your earnings for this section.  Next I will explain how these choices affect 
your earnings for this section of the experiment.   
 
A set of thirteen cards labeled 1 through 13 will be used to determine payoffs.  After all 
participants have made their choices, one of the participants will be selected to draw a card to 
determine which one of the thirteen decisions will be used.  Again, even though you make 
thirteen decisions, only one of these decides your earnings, but you do not know in advance 
which decision will be used.  Note that each decision has an equal chance of determining 
your earnings for this section.  Your after-tax income from the binding decision is yours to 
keep and will be paid to you in cash. 
  
 You may not confer with other participants in making your decisions at any time.  When 
all participants have recorded their votes for the taxes they prefer on both their Section 3 Record 
Sheets and their thirteen Decision Sheets, a monitor will come by and check that the votes are 
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correctly recorded on the Record and Decision Sheets.  A monitor will tally the votes for each 
group and record the outcome of each group’s majority vote on an overhead transparency.  The 
outcome will be displayed to everyone only after all participants have recorded their decisions. 
 
 This is the end of the instructions for this section, if you have any questions on this 
section of the instructions please ask them now. An experimenter will distribute the Tax 
Tables for the thirteen decisions at this time.  When you have made your thirteen choices, please 
turn your Record and Decisions Sheets face down so that an experimenter may collect them.  
You have 30 minutes to complete the thirteen decisions. 
 
[New page] 
 
Group Number _____     Participant ID  ______ 
 
 
Decision 1 
Tax Table 
The tax you pay on your pre-tax income will be one of two types.  The following table 
summarizes the tax that is paid for each income level. 
 
 
Pre-tax 
Income 
Tax 1 Tax 2 
Tax After-Tax 
Income 
Tax After-Tax 
Income 
$10.00 $5.00 $5.00 $1.00 $9.00
$20.00 $5.00 $15.00 $6.00 $14.00
$30.00 $5.00 $25.00 $6.00 $24.00
$40.00 $5.00 $35.00 $6.00 $34.00
$50.00 $5.00 $45.00 $6.00 $44.00
Total $25.00 $125.00 $25.00 $125.00
Your Vote 
Circle one of the following:          Tax 1           or            Tax 2 
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Decision 2 
Tax Table 
 
The tax you pay on your pre-tax income will be one of two types.  The following table 
summarizes the tax that is paid for each income level. 
 
 
Pre-tax 
Income 
Tax 1 Tax 2 
Tax After-Tax 
Income 
Tax After-Tax 
Income 
$10.00 $5.00 $5.00 $8.00 $2.00
$20.00 $5.00 $15.00 $15.00 $5.00
$30.00 $5.00 $25.00 -$7.00 $37.00
$40.00 $5.00 $35.00 $5.00 $35.00
$50.00 $5.00 $45.00 $4.00 $46.00
Total $25.00 $125.00 $25.00 $125.00
Your Vote 
Circle one of the following:          Tax 1           or            Tax 2 
 
[New page]                                  
Decision 3 
Tax Table 
 
The tax you pay on your pre-tax income will be one of two types.  The following table 
summarizes the tax that is paid for each income level. 
 
 
Pre-tax 
Income 
Tax 1 Tax 2 
Tax After-Tax 
Income 
Tax After-Tax 
Income 
$10.00 $5.00 $5.00 -$15.00 $25.00
$20.00 $5.00 $15.00 $3.00 $17.00
$30.00 $5.00 $25.00 $7.00 $23.00
$40.00 $5.00 $35.00 $11.00 $29.00
$50.00 $5.00 $45.00 $25.00 $25.00
Total $25.00 $125.00 $31.00 $119.00
Your Vote 
Circle one of the following:          Tax 1           or            Tax 2 
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Decision 4 
Tax Table 
 
The tax you pay on your pre-tax income will be one of two types.  The following table 
summarizes the tax that is paid for each income level. 
 
 
Pre-tax 
Income 
Tax 1 Tax 2 
Tax After-Tax 
Income 
Tax After-Tax 
Income 
$10.00 $5.00 $5.00 $8.00 $2.00
$20.00 $5.00 $15.00 $4.00 $16.00
$30.00 $5.00 $25.00 -$9.00 $39.00
$40.00 $5.00 $35.00 $8.00 $32.00
$50.00 $5.00 $45.00 $1.00 $49.00
Total $25.00 $125.00 $12.00 $138.00
Your Vote 
Circle one of the following:          Tax 1           or            Tax 2 
 
[New page] 
Decision 5 
Tax Table 
 
The tax you pay on your pre-tax income will be one of two types.  The following table 
summarizes the tax that is paid for each income level. 
 
 
Pre-tax 
Income 
Tax 1 Tax 2 
Tax After-Tax 
Income 
Tax After-Tax 
Income 
$10.00 $5.00 $5.00 -$17.00 $27.00
$20.00 $5.00 $15.00 -$4.00 $24.00
$30.00 $5.00 $25.00 -$2.00 $32.00
$40.00 $5.00 $35.00 $38.00 $2.00
$50.00 $5.00 $45.00 $20.00 $30.00
Total $25.00 $125.00 $35.00 $115.00
Your Vote 
Circle one of the following:          Tax 1           or            Tax 2 
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Decision 6 
Tax Table 
 
The tax you pay on your pre-tax income will be one of two types.  The following table 
summarizes the tax that is paid for each income level. 
 
 
Pre-tax 
Income 
Tax 1 Tax 2 
Tax After-Tax 
Income 
Tax After-Tax 
Income 
$10.00 $5.00 $5.00 $6.00 $4.00
$20.00 $5.00 $15.00 $6.00 $14.00
$30.00 $5.00 $25.00 $6.00 $24.00
$40.00 $5.00 $35.00 $6.00 $34.00
$50.00 $5.00 $45.00 $6.00 $44.00
Total $25.00 $125.00 $30.00 $120.00
Your Vote 
Circle one of the following:          Tax 1           or            Tax 2 
 
[New page] 
 
Decision 7 
Tax Table 
 
The tax you pay on your pre-tax income will be one of two types.  The following table 
summarizes the tax that is paid for each income level. 
 
 
Pre-tax 
Income 
Tax 1 Tax 2 
Tax After-Tax 
Income 
Tax After-Tax 
Income 
$10.00 $5.00 $5.00 $1.00 $9.00
$20.00 $5.00 $15.00 $12.00 $8.00
$30.00 $5.00 $25.00 $14.00 $16.00
$40.00 $5.00 $35.00 $0.00 $40.00
$50.00 $5.00 $45.00 $6.00 $44.00
Total $25.00 $125.00 $33.00 $117.00
Your Vote 
Circle one of the following:          Tax 1           or            Tax 2 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
25
 
 
[New page] 
 
Decision 8 
Tax Table 
 
The tax you pay on your pre-tax income will be one of two types.  The following table 
summarizes the tax that is paid for each income level. 
 
 
Pre-tax 
Income 
Tax 1 Tax 2 
Tax After-Tax 
Income 
Tax After-Tax 
Income 
$10.00 $5.00 $5.00 $6.00 $4.00
$20.00 $5.00 $15.00 $3.00 $17.00
$30.00 $5.00 $25.00 $0.00 $30.00
$40.00 $5.00 $35.00 $15.00 $25.00
$50.00 $5.00 $45.00 $6.00 $44.00
Total $25.00 $125.00 $30.00 $120.00
Your Vote 
Circle one of the following:          Tax 1           or            Tax 2  
 
[New page] 
 
Decision 9 
Tax Table 
 
The tax you pay on your pre-tax income will be one of two types.  The following table 
summarizes the tax that is paid for each income level. 
 
 
Pre-tax 
Income 
Tax 1 Tax 2 
Tax After-Tax 
Income 
Tax After-Tax 
Income 
$10.00 $5.00 $5.00 -$25.00 $35.00
$20.00 $5.00 $15.00 -$10.00 $30.00
$30.00 $5.00 $25.00 $1.00 $29.00
$40.00 $5.00 $35.00 $11.00 $29.00
$50.00 $5.00 $45.00 $48.00 $2.00
Total $25.00 $125.00 $25.00 $125.00
Your Vote 
Circle one of the following:          Tax 1           or            Tax 2 
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Decision 10 
Tax Table 
 
The tax you pay on your pre-tax income will be one of two types.  The following table 
summarizes the tax that is paid for each income level. 
 
 
Pre-tax 
Income 
Tax 1 Tax 2 
Tax After-Tax 
Income 
Tax After-Tax 
Income 
$10.00 $5.00 $5.00 -$13.00 $23.00
$20.00 $5.00 $15.00 -$4.00 $24.00
$30.00 $5.00 $25.00 $28.00 $2.00
$40.00 $5.00 $35.00 $9.00 $31.00
$50.00 $5.00 $45.00 $17.00 $23.00
Total $25.00 $125.00 $37.00 $103.00
Your Vote 
Circle one of the following:          Tax 1           or            Tax 2 
 
[New page] 
 
Decision 11 
Tax Table 
 
The tax you pay on your pre-tax income will be one of two types.  The following table 
summarizes the tax that is paid for each income level. 
 
 
Pre-tax 
Income 
Tax 1 Tax 2 
Tax After-Tax 
Income 
Tax After-Tax 
Income 
$10.00 $5.00 $5.00 -$15.00 $25.00
$20.00 $5.00 $15.00 -$5.00 $25.00
$30.00 $5.00 $25.00 $5.00 $25.00
$40.00 $5.00 $35.00 $15.00 $25.00
$50.00 $5.00 $45.00 $25.00 $25.00
Total $25.00 $125.00 $25.00 $125.00
Your Vote 
Circle one of the following:          Tax 1           or            Tax 2 
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Decision 12 
Tax Table 
 
The tax you pay on your pre-tax income will be one of two types.  The following table 
summarizes the tax that is paid for each income level. 
 
 
Pre-tax 
Income 
Tax 1 Tax 2 
Tax After-Tax 
Income 
Tax After-Tax 
Income 
$10.00 $5.00 $5.00 -$10.00 $20.00
$20.00 $5.00 $15.00 $0.00 $20.00
$30.00 $5.00 $25.00 $10.00 $20.00
$40.00 $5.00 $35.00 $20.00 $20.00
$50.00 $5.00 $45.00 $30.00 $20.00
Total $25.00 $125.00 $50.00 $100.00
Your Vote 
Circle one of the following:          Tax 1           or            Tax 2 
 
[New page] 
Decision 13 
Tax Table 
 
The tax you pay on your pre-tax income will be one of two types.  The following table 
summarizes the tax that is paid for each income level. 
 
 
Pre-tax 
Income 
Tax 1 Tax 2 
Tax After-Tax 
Income 
Tax After-Tax 
Income 
$10.00 $5.00 $5.00 -$1.00 $11.00
$20.00 $5.00 $15.00 $9.00 $11.00
$30.00 $5.00 $25.00 $9.00 $21.00
$40.00 $5.00 $35.00 $9.00 $31.00
$50.00 $5.00 $45.00 $9.00 $41.00
Total $25.00 $125.00 $35.00 $115.00
Your Vote 
Circle one of the following:          Tax 1           or            Tax 2 
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[New page] 
         Participant ID   
 
Section 3 Record Sheet 
 
Decision Group 
Number 
Your Vote 
(Tax 1 or Tax 2) 
Group 
Majority 
Vote 
(Tax 1 or Tax 2) 
Your  
Pre-tax 
Income 
(income card) 
Your 
Taxes 
Paid* 
Your 
After-tax 
Income 
1       
2       
3       
4       
5       
6       
7       
8       
9       
10       
11       
12       
13       
* The amount you pay in taxes is determined by your income level and the majority vote for Tax 
1or Tax 2. 
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[New page] 
Earnings Determination 
 
Section 3 Earnings: 
 
 Note the randomized groups on the overhead for each Tax Table Decision and each 
group’s majority vote.  Please verify that your recorded group number for each decision 
corresponds to that on the overhead.  At this time, a card will be randomly chosen that will 
designate which of the thirteen decisions will determine your earnings. [Stop for drawing of the 
card and calculation of the majority vote for the binding Tax Table decision.]  Please record on 
your cumulative record sheet the binding Tax Table Decision number chosen and your group’s 
majority vote. Please calculate your earnings and a monitor will come by to check your 
calculations. 
 
 
Section 1 Earnings: 
 
 At this time a participant will be randomly selected to toss the coin while two other 
participants will verify with the monitor whether the toss landed as tales or heads.  
[Stop for coin toss.]  Record the toss of the coin [2.5 for heads (success) and 0 for tails (failure)] 
and calculate your Section 1 earnings at this time.  A monitor will come by and check your 
calculations. 
 
 
Section 2 Earnings: 
 
 At this time participants will randomly draw the code ID chips from the bucket.  The 
drawn code ID’s will be recorded on the overhead.  Those participants with the drawn code ID’s 
are the allocators and will earn the allocation amount that they allocated to themselves.  Those 
participants whose code ID’s are not drawn are the recipients.  Your earnings will be randomly 
selected from the chosen allocators’ recipient sheets.  [Stop for drawing of chips.]   If your chip 
was drawn please record your earnings at this time.  If your code ID was not drawn, then record 
the recipient’s allocation as your earnings from the sheet you receive.  A monitor will come by 
and check your calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30
 
 
[New page] 
        Participant ID   
 
Cumulative Record Sheet  
 
Instruction Section 1: 
Total amount not invested and the result of the investment. 
 
$ 
Instruction Section 2: 
The cash allocation to yourself if you are an allocator or that 
allocated by a randomly paired participant if you are a recipient. 
 
$ 
Instruction Section 3: 
After-tax income from binding round 
(Your pre-tax income was $____.) 
(The binding Tax Table was number ____.)  
 
$ 
Add $4 if on time for the experiment. 
 
 
$ 
Add $4 for completion of post-experiment questionnaire. 
 
$ 
Your total cash earnings for participation is this session. 
 
 
$ 
 
 
   
[New page] 
 
         Participant ID   
 
Post-Experiment Questionnaire 
 
This questionnaire is designed to collect general information.  Such information may help us 
better understand differences found between participants in this experiment.   
 
1. What year are you in university (e.g., 2nd, 3rd, 4th, Masters, Ph.D.)? _________   
 
2. What is your major or concentration (e.g., accounting, economics, etc.)? ___________ 
 
3. What is your sex? male _____   female _____ 
 
4. What is your age? _____ years 
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5a. What are your means of financial support (check all that apply)? 
_____ self supported 
_____ parent or relative  
_____ spouse or significant other 
_____ financial aid or other loans 
_____ scholarship 
_____ other 
 
5b. Referring to question 5a., what is your total household income (check one)? 
_____ $0 - $25,000 
_____ $25,001 - $50,000 
_____ $50,001 - $75,000 
_____ $75,001 - $100,000 
_____ More than $100,000 
 
5c. What is your primary means of financial support (check only one)? 
_____ self supported 
_____ parent or relative  
_____ spouse or significant other 
_____ financial aid or other loans 
_____ scholarship 
_____ other 
 
6. How many finance and economics courses have you successfully completed at the university 
level? 
_____ courses 
 
7. How many finance and economics courses are you currently enrolled in?  
_____ courses 
 
8. How interesting did you find this experiment? (circle the appropriate number) 
Not very          Very 
Interesting          Interesting 
     1--------2--------3--------4--------5--------6--------7--------8--------9-------10--------11 
 
9. For the time spent, how would you characterize the amount of money earned for participating 
in this experiment? (circle the appropriate number) 
Nominal          Considerable 
Amount          Amount 
     1--------2--------3--------4--------5--------6--------7--------8--------9-------10--------11 
 
10. Would you, in general, prefer an income tax structure in the United States where everyone 
pays the same tax, regardless of income or wealth, or a tax that varies across income levels? 
 
11. Is there any circumstance in which your answer to question 10 would change?  Why? 
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Figure 1 
Histogram of Investment in the Risky Asset 
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Figure 2 
Histogram of Self Allocation 
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Figure 3 
Relative frequency of sacrifice 
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Figure 4 
Histogram of social votes by status 
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Table 1 
Experimental Sessions 
 
Experiment 
Session Participants 
Number of  
Participants 
Coin Toss for 
Section 1 
1 Students 20 Heads  
2 Students 20 Tales 
3 Policy Group 20 Heads 
4 Policy Group 20 Tales 
5 Students 10 Heads 
6 Students 20 Heads 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41
 
 
Table 2 
 
Summary Statistics 
(means; standard deviations in parentheses) 
Variable All Students Professionals 
Number of years in university 5.3 (1.7) 
5.0 
(1.5) 
6.0 
(1.8) 
Gender (female = 1.0) 35% 42% 21% 
Number of economics courses  4.8 (6.1) 
5.0 
(6.0) 
4.3 
(6.4) 
Business majors 65% 57% 82% 
Age 31.6 (10.1) 
26.2 
(4.7) 
41.4 
(9.8) 
Source of support 
  Self 65% 49% 95% 
  Parents 24% 35% 5% 
  Spouse 7% 12% 0% 
  Financial aid 28% 38% 10.5% 
  Scholarship 30% 43% 5.3% 
  Other 5% 7% 0% 
Total household income 
  $0 - $25,000 64% 55% 82% 
  $25,001 - $50,000 15% 20% 5% 
  $50,001 - $75,000 8% 12% 3% 
  $75,001 - $100,000 6% 7% 3% 
  Greater than $100,000 7% 6% 8% 
Number of observations 107 69 38 
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Table 3 
OLS estimates of investment in the risky asset 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Years in university 0.06 (0.14) 
0.06 
(0.14) 
0.071 
(0.138) 
0.12 
(0.15) 
0.28* 
(0.15) 
0.28* 
(0.15) 
Gender (female = 1) -0.87** (0.38) 
-0.87** 
(0.38) 
-0.899** 
(0.383) 
-0.94** 
(0.39) 
-1.05*** 
(0.40) 
-0.89** 
(0.40) 
Policy students  0.76* (0.47) 
0.77* 
(0.47) 
0.598 
(0.488) 
0.62* 
(0.49) 
1.23*** 
(0.52) 
1.01* 
(0.56) 
Economics courses  0.01 (0.04) 
-0.004 
(0.044) 
-0.01 
(0.045) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
Business students   0.542 (0.477) 
0.57 
(0.47) 
0.38 
(0.46) 
0.20 
(0.46) 
Total household income    0.19 (0.16) 
0.07 
(0.15) 
-0.01 
(0.15) 
Age      -0.01** (0.003) 
-0.41** 
(0.20) 
Age-square     0.01* (0.003) 
0.005* 
(0.002) 
Self support      0.89** (0.44) 
Parental support      0.81 (0.52) 
Spousal support      0.46 (0.51) 
Constant 5.86*** (0.78) 
5.81*** 
(0.78) 
5.508*** 
(0.850) 
4.93*** 
(1.04) 
12.48*** 
(3.05) 
10.84*** 
(3.43) 
Number of observations 107 107 107 107 107 107 
Adjusted R-square 0.06 0.05 0.6 0.06 0.11 0.14 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4 
OLS estimates of self allocation in a dictator game 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Years in university 0.0002 (0.10) 
0.002 
(0.10) 
0.006 
(0.10) 
0.002 
(0.10) 
0.06 
(0.13) 
0.008 
(0.14) 
Gender (female = 1) -0.05 (0.42) 
-0.01 
(0.42) 
-0.02 
(0.41) 
-0.017 
(0.41) 
-0.15 
(0.42) 
-0.04 
(0.43) 
Policy students -0.47 (0.43) 
-0.43 
(0.42) 
-0.47 
(0.45) 
-0.48 
(0.46) 
0.14 
(0.65) 
0.36 
(0.64) 
Economics courses  0.072** (0.03) 
0.07** 
(0.03) 
0.07** 
(0.03) 
0.08*** 
(0.03) 
0.06** 
(0.03) 
Business students   0.16 (0.48) 
0.15 
(0.48) 
0.02 
(0.50) 
0.19 
(0.48) 
Total household income    -0.01 (0.17) 
-0.08 
(0.17) 
-0.05 
(0.16) 
Age     -0.13 (0.19) 
-0.009 
(0.21) 
Age-square     0.001 (0.003) 
-0.0003 
(0.003) 
Self support      -1.02** (0.46) 
Parental support      0.32 (0.57) 
Spousal support      -1.20* (0.65) 
Constant 7.11*** (0.59) 
6.73*** 
(0.57) 
6.64*** 
(0.61) 
6.68*** 
(0.73) 
9.26*** 
(3.00) 
7.76** 
(3.22) 
Number of observations 107 107 107 107 107 107 
R-squared 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.15 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5 
Probit model of social votes in a multi-player tax game 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Status 0.015*** (0.004) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.014*** 
(0.009) 
Self allocation in dictator game  -0.076*** (0.021) 
-0.067*** 
(0.022) 
-0.064*** 
(0.022) 
-0.064*** 
(0.022) 
-0.055** 
(0.022) 
-0.040* 
(0.023) 
Investment in risky asset 0.013 (0.019) 
0.015 
(0.020) 
0.030 
(0.021) 
0.033 
(0.021) 
0.046* 
(0.022) 
0.032 
(0.022) 
Sacrifice -0.0002 (0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
0.0001 
(0.006) 
0.0000 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
Disadvantageous inequality 0.006 (0.005) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
Advantageous inequality -0.023*** (0.007) 
-0.024*** 
(0.007) 
-0.025*** 
(0.007) 
-0.024*** 
(0.007) 
-0.025*** 
(0.007) 
-0.025*** 
(0.007) 
Years in university  -0.087*** (0.026) 
-0.099*** 
(0.027) 
-0.116*** 
(0.028) 
-0.132*** 
(0.031) 
-0.031*** 
(0.0.79) 
Gender (female = 1)  0.121 (0.090) 
0.188** 
(0.092) 
0.207** 
(0.093) 
0.289*** 
(0.098) 
0.301*** 
(0.010) 
Policy students  0.271*** (0.091) 
0.393*** 
(0.096) 
0.374*** 
(0.097) 
0.134 
(0.137) 
0.067 
(0.144) 
Number of economics courses  -0.004 (0.007) 
0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
0.007 
(0.008) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
Business students   -0.427*** (0.094) 
-0.439*** 
(0.094) 
-0.406*** 
(0.095) 
-0.441*** 
(0.097) 
Total household income     -0.071** (0.036) 
-0.052 
(0.037) 
-0.066* 
(0.039) 
Age     0.040 (0.039) 
-0.029 
(0.043) 
Age-squared     -0.0003 (0.0005) 
-0.0002 
(0.001) 
Self support      0.289*** (0.108) 
Parental support      0.062 (0.130) 
Spousal support      0.128 (0.159) 
Constant -0.924*** (0.212) 
-0.678*** 
(0.249) 
-0.569** 
(0.251) 
-0.370 
(0.270) 
-1.311* 
(0.715) 
-1.364 
(0.766) 
Number of observations 1,391 1,391 1,391 1,391 1,391 1,391 
Log likehood  -617.01 -608.45 -5979 -0.596.00 -592.42 -588.56 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
